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CHAPTER 10  
 
The Non-proliferation Policy of the European Union  
 
Panos Koutrakos* 
 
I. Introduction   
 
The profile of the European Union (EU) in non-proliferation has become higher in the 
light of its involvement with Iran.1 However, the Union became interested in pursuing 
non-proliferation policies as soon as it started shaping its international role. After all, 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) covers ‘all areas of foreign and 
security policy’ (Article 24 TEU), and its objectives include ‘to strengthen 
international security' (Article 21(2)(c) TEU). This became clearer by the 
Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003 which adopted a Declaration on Non-
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction where non-proliferation is identified as 
‘a central element in the EU external action, including the common foreign and 
security policy’.2 
 
It was the events of 11 September 2001 which gave the EU non-proliferation policy a 
sense of urgency and momentum. Meeting ten days later at an extraordinary meeting, 
the European Council set out a plan of action for the fight against terrorism, the latter 
defined as ‘a priority objective for the European Union’.3 Shortly afterwards, the 
Council elaborated on the implications of the terrorist threat on the non-proliferation, 
disarmament and arms control policy of the Union.4 This document became the 
starting point for the gradual development of the EU’s non proliferation policy. In the 
host of documents and initiatives shaping this policy (European Council Declarations, 
Council Conclusions, Presidency Reports, Reports endorsed by the Council, and a 
number of measures adopted and proposed under the Community legal order as well 
as the second and third pillars), two have been central: the 2003 Strategy against 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD Strategy),5 and the Strategy to 
combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of Small Arm and Light Weapons 
(SALW) and their ammunition (SALW Strategy).6  
 
An exhaustive analysis of this landscape is beyond the confines of this Chapter. 
Instead, this aims to identify the threads which bring these initiatives together, the 
                                                
    *Professor of European Union Law and Jean Monnet Chair in European Law, University of Bristol; 
Professor of Law, University of Antwerp.  
1 For an earlier account, see E Denza, ‘Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The European Union 
and Iran’, (2005) 10 European Foreign Affairs Review 289.  
2 Thessaloniki European Council, 19 and 20 June 2003, Presidency Conclusions, Annex II, 37. 
3 Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 
2001, 1.   
4Council Conclusions, Brussels, 29 November 2001, 14732/01. 
5 Doc. 15708/03 EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Brussels, 10 
December 2003). 
6 Doc. 5319/06 (Brussels, 13 January 2006). Its provisions supplement the existing framework as set 
out in CFSP measures: Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP on the European Union’s contribution to combating 
the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons [1999] OJ L 9/1, repealed 
by Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP [2002] OJ L 191/1. 
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ways in which they relate to international legal developments, and the light they shed 
on the role of the EU as an international actor.   
 
II. Horizontal principles governing EU non-proliferation policy  
 
The Union’s various non-proliferation initiatives are characterised by a number of 
principles.  
 
A.  Commitment to effective multilateralism  
 
This is a constant theme in the EU initiatives. The WMD Strategy states the Union’s 
‘conviction that a multilateralist approach to security, including disarmament and 
non-proliferation, provides the best way to maintain international order and hence our 
commitment to uphold, implement and strengthen the multilateral disarmament and 
non-proliferation treaties and agreements’.7 Indeed, effective multilateralism is 
viewed as ‘the cornerstone of the European strategy for combating proliferations of 
WMD’.8 Similarly, the starting point for the SALW Strategy is the United Nations 
Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms 
and light weapons in all its aspects, which stresses the need for complementarity at 
global, regional and national levels in its implementation.9  
 
This commitment is consistent with the clear focus on effective multilateralism which 
underpins the EU external relations and which is expressed more distinctly in recent 
years,10 not least in the Lisbon Treaty which refers to it as an objective to be pursued 
by the entire range of EU external policies.11 
 
In relation to non-proliferation in particular, the commitment to effective 
multilateralism takes various forms some of which are outlined below. .   
  
(i) Universalisation of relevant international treaties  
 
Political efforts to ensure universal adherence to international instruments relating to 
WMD and their means of delivery are central to the Union’s policy. This has become 
apparent by the adoption of Common Position 2003/905/CFSP specifically dealing 
with the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the area.12 
Drawing on previous commitments to this effect,13  its aim is to ‘serve as a yardstick 
in the negotiations of EU positions in international forums’.14 
 
This instrument refers to five specific international sets of rules: the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and Safeguards Agreements (NPT), the Additional Protocols with the 
                                                
7 N5 above, 5. 
8 Ibid, 6.  
9 UN Document A/CONF.192/15 (20 July 2001).  
10 See COM (2003) 526 fin ‘The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of 
multilateralism and European Security Strategy’, 9 et seq. 
11 Art. 21(2)(h) TEU Lisbon. 
12 Common Position 2003/805/CFSP [2003] OJ L 302/34. 
13 See, for instance, the WMD Strategy, n4 above, 9, as well as the Declaration on Non-Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Thessaloniki European Council , Presidency Conclusions, Annex II, 
37).  
14 N 12 above, recital (3) of Preamble. 
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International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA Additional Protocols), the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
(BTWC), the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. It sets 
out two objectives: to promote the universal ratification of and adherence to these 
instruments, and to reinforce their provisions, including by ensuring compliance. In 
addition, the Common Position aims to promote the early entry into force of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBTO). This commitment of the Union 
and its Member States have been articulated and set out in detail in relation to specific 
Treaties individually.15  
 
(ii)  Reinforcement of the role of the United Nations 
 
This has been central to the EU’s policy since its inception. The Thessaloniki 
Declaration states that the EU ‘will focus in particular on [amongst others] fostering 
the role of the UN Security Council (UNSC), and enhancing its expertise in meeting 
the challenge of proliferation’.16 In this vein, the WMD Strategy states that, once 
political and diplomatic preventative measures have failed and coercive measures 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are envisaged, ‘the role of the UN Security 
Council, as the final arbiter on the consequences of non-compliance – as foreseen in 
multilateral regimes – needs to be effectively strengthened’.17 This also underpins 
Common Position 2003/805/CFSP which refers to the need to strengthen the role of 
UNSC as it has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security,18 as well as the SALW Strategy. 
 
A specific illustration of the UN-EU interaction is provided by UNSC Resolution 
1540 (2004). Adopted in April 2004 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it deals 
with Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and, in effect, requires that 
states prevent WMD materials or technology falling into the hands of terrorists. It 
forbids states from supporting non-state actors involved in terrorism, obliges them to 
enact and enforce the necessary laws to prevent proliferation activities on their 
territories, and requires them to monitor and control sensitive technologies, materials 
and equipment that exist in, are manufactured by, or transit their territories.19  
 
The European Council welcomed the adoption of the Resolution and invited the 
Council ‘to review the appropriate political and legal instruments, including possible 
actions within the framework of Justice and Home Affairs, that would further the 
adoption of concrete steps towards this objective’.20  
 
                                                
15 See Common Position 2005/329/CFSP on 2005 NPT Review Conference [2005] OJ L 106/32, 
Common Position 2006/242/CFSP on the 2006 BTWC Review Conference [2006] OJ L 88/65, 
Common Position 2007/469/CFSP on the 2008 CWC Review Conference [2007] OJ L 176/39.   
16 N 2 above, 38. 
17 N 5 above, para. 17. To that effect, there is provision for enabling it’ to benefit from independent 
expertise and a pool of readily available competence, on order to carry out the verification of 
proliferating activities that are a potential threat to international peace and security’.  
18 N 12 above, Art. 2. See also Art. 8 which mentions the need strengthen the links between the Hague 
Code against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the EU system. 
19 Art. 3.    
20 Doc. 10774/04, Declaration by the European Council on Criminal Sanctions (Brussels, 13 June 
2004), 2.  
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In the Union’s initiatives in this area, grand policy statements coexist with practical, 
bottom-up, specific measures. An example is provided by the Union’s efforts to 
support compliance with UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004). The latter requires that the 
States submit a Report on a Security Council Committee on steps they have taken in 
order to comply with its provisions. In addition to individual reports submitted by its 
Member States, the EU presented a Report drawn up by the Netherlands Presidency 
assisted by the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and 
in full association with the Commission.21 Furthermore, it has relied upon its legal 
panoply in order to encourage actively third States to comply with their duties and 
submit a report: it carried out demarches and organised and funded programmes in 
three areas identified by the Committee 1540 (Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, 
Asia-Pacific) which aimed to raise awareness of requirements and obligations under 
the Resolution, to strengthen national capacities in drafting national reports on its 
implementation, and share experience from the adoption of national measures 
required for the implementation of the Resolution.22 
 
Later on, when the Committee 1540 suggested that the focus shift to implementation 
of the Resolution and the practical steps which some states in certain areas find 
difficult to take, the EU responded by drawing road maps tied in with the provision of 
technical assistance. It targeted border, customs and regulatory officials within six 
regions (Africa, Central America, Mercosur, the Middle East and Gulf Regions, 
Pacific Islands and South-East Asia). It, then, organised six workshops covering the 
main elements of an export control process including applicable laws (including 
national and international legal aspects), regulatory controls (including licensing 
provisions, end-user verification and awareness-raising programmes) and enforcement 
(including commodity identification, risk-assessment and detection methods).23  
 
(iii)  Provision of financial and technical support for specific projects carried out in 
the context of international non-proliferation treaties aiming to enhance compliance  
 
The universalisation of international non-proliferation treaty mechanisms has been 
supported by the EU pursuant to a range of specific measures. For instance, the Union 
has provided financial support for activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) – these include measures promoting the universalisation 
of CWP (by the organisation of workshops on CWP for States which are not parties in 
areas such as the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East), the effective 
implementation of CWP (by the organisation of assistance meetings and seminars), 
and international cooperation in the field of chemical activities (by providing 
equipment support and laboratory assistance).24 Similar measures were also funded in 
support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC),25 in relation to 
                                                
21 Brussels, October 2004.  
22 Joint Action 2006/419/CFSP [2006] OJ L 165/30.  
23 Joint Action 2008/368/CFSP [2008] OJ L 127/78. 
24 Joint Action 2004/797/CFSP [2004] OJ L349/63. This was followed up by Joint Action  
2005/913/CFSP [2005] OJ L 331/34, and Joint Action 2007/185/CFSP [2007] OJ L 85/10 (the latter 
points out that ‘since the beginning of the implementation of the EU Joint Actions in support of the 
OPCW in 2005, 14 countries have signed and ratified the CWC, bringing the number of OPCW 
Member States up to 181’ (recital 4).  
25 Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP [2006] OJ L 65/51, followed up by Joint Action 2008/858/CFSP [2008] 
OJ L 302/29. 
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which the EU also introduced projects in support of activities carried out by World 
Health Organisation in the area of laboratory bio-safety and biosecurity.26  
 
Financial support is also provided to the Preparatory Commission of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), provisionally 
responsible for the effective implementation of the CTBTO, to support its activities in 
the area of training and capacity building for verification (in particular the 
development of a computer-based training programme).27 Finally, the EU has funded 
IAEA activities under its Nuclear Security Programme28 
 
(iv)  Export controls  
 
The regulation and management of export controls are central to the non-proliferation 
policy of the EU. The WMD Strategy outlines the objective of ‘making the EU a 
leading cooperative player in the export control regimes’.29 The means to achieve this 
vary, and include coordination of EU positions within the different regimes, support 
of the membership of acceding countries, promotion of a catch-all clause in export 
controls regimes, and strengthening information exchange. Similarly, the SALW 
Strategy, in its action plan, commits to support the strengthening of export controls 
and assist third countries in the process of drafting relevant legislation.  
 
There are various such regimes and the link of the EU with them varies. The 
European Commission is an observer in the Zangger Committee (dealing with the 
interpretation of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty whose 37 members include all 
the nuclear weapon states) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (a group of nuclear 
supplier countries with 45 members). It participates in the Australia Group (a group of 
41 suppliers and/or trans-shippers of chemicals, biological agents and/or production 
equipment which could be used in chemical and/or biological weapons programmes). 
It does not participate in the Missile Technology Control Regime (aiming to non-
proliferation of unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction) and the 
Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use goods 
and technologies. 
 
In terms of their regulation and management, export controls of military equipment 
and dual-use goods have given rise to different issues: the former has been viewed as 
falling beyond the scope of Community legal order, whereas the regulation of the 
latter, covering products which may be of both civil and military application, has 
given rise to considerable controversy  between the EU institutions and the Member 
States. 
 
 (a)  Armaments 
 
                                                
26 Joint Action 2008/307/CFSP [2008] OJ L 106/17. 
27 Joint Action 2006/243/CFSP [2006] OJ L 88/68. This was followed up by financial assistance on 
other matters under Joint Action 2007/468/CFSP OJ L 176/31, and Joint Action 2008/588/CFSP [2008] 
OJ L 189/28. 
28 Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP [2004] OJ L 182/46, followed up by Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP 
[2005] OJ L 193/44, Joint Action 2006/418/CFSP [2006] OJ L 165/20, Joint Action 2007/185/CFSP 
[2007] OJ L 85/10. 
29 N 5 above, 10. 
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The EU rules on exports of military technology and equipment are laid down in 
Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.30 Formalising an earlier Code of Conduct31 whose 
scope was defined in 200032 and whose provisions are updated regularly33 and 
assessed by the Council annually,34 this set of rules puts forward eight criteria on the 
basis of which national authorities are to assess the export licence applications they 
receive for items included in the EU Common Military List. These criteria include the 
following: respect for the international obligations and commitments of Member 
States; respect for human rights in the country of final destination as well as respect 
by that country of international humanitarian law; internal situation in the country of 
final destination; preservation of regional peace, security and stability; national 
security of the Member States, as well as that of friendly and allied countries; 
behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards 
in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for 
international law; existence of a risk that the military technology or equipment will be 
diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions; 
compatibility of the exports of the military technology or equipment with the 
technical and economic capacity of the recipient country.  
 
As for its material scope, the Common Position applies to exports, brokering, transit 
or transhipment, as well as any intangible transfer of software and technology. It also 
provides for a consultation procedure (following circulation of details of exports 
denied) in confidence.35 
 
The Union’s commitment to effective multilateralism and the role of the UN is 
illustrated clearly by the content of the criteria set out in the Common Position. 
Compliance with sanctions regimes adopted by the UN Security Council is expressly 
mentioned in the context of the criteria which national authorities must observe, along 
with the commitments of Member States to enforce UN and OSCE arms embargoes. 
Similarly, reference is made to the rules and guidelines of the various international 
export control regimes. In this vein, national authorities are required to exercise 
special caution and vigilance in issuing licences to countries where serious violations 
of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN.   
 
The Union has taken steps to promote respect for the criteria set out in the Code (and, 
one would presume, the Common Position too) beyond its own borders. It has funded 
and organised workshops aiming to provide technical assistance to targeted third 
countries (in South Eastern Europe, North African and Mediterranean partners and 
Eastern European Caucasian partners of ENP, Turkey and Ukraine).36 These are 
organised by the Presidency and run by the Council Secretariat.  
 
                                                
30 Common Position 2008/944/CFSP [2008] OJ L 335/99. 
31 Doc. 8675/2/98 (Brussels, 5 June 1998). 
32 Common Military List of the European Union [2000] OJ C 191/1. 
33 For the most recent amendment, see [2008] OJ C 98/1. 
34 For the most recent report, see [2008] OJ C 300/1. 
35 The Council Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports produced a User’s Guide to the EU Code 
of Conduct on Arms Exports (last updated on 29 February 2008: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st07/st07486.en08.pdf). Under Art. 13 of Common 
Position 2008/944/CFSP, this serves as guidance for its implementation.  
36 See Joint Action 2008/230/CFSP [2008] OJ L 75/81. 
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In relation to arms brokering in particular, the EU adopted a specific measure 
requiring that Member States apply a licence or written authorisation system for arms 
brokering Member States and establish a system for exchange of information on 
brokering activities among themselves as well as with third countries.37 Again, this 
measure is underpinned by the Union’s commitment to effective multilateralism, as its 
objective is to control arms brokering in order, amongst others, to avoid 
circumvention of, amongst others, UN and OSCE embargoes on arms exports.  
 
 (b) Dual-use Goods 
 
The legal regulation of exports of dual-use goods provides some quite interesting 
insight in both the interaction between the international legal order and the 
Community legal order, as well as the various forces which shape the development of 
the latter. Exports of dual-use goods have been a central part of any export controls 
regime. The Thessaloniki Action Plan provided for a process of peer review of the 
export control rules of all Member States (as well as the acceding countries). In 
December 2004, the Council endorsed the recommendations which formed the 
outcome of this process (as formulated by a Task Force which assisted the EU 
institution in the conduct of the process).38 One of the recommendations was to reach 
agreement on best practices for the enforcement of controls. This process gave rise to 
work in the Council bodies39 and then a proposal by the Commission on the review of 
the EC rules in December 2006.40 This was accompanied by a legislative proposal41 
which led to the adoption of the current rules, laid down in Council Regulation 
428/2009.42  
 
The very starting point of this instrument is the international framework: ‘[a]n 
effective common system of export controls on dual-use items is necessary to ensure 
that the international commitments and responsibilities of the Member States, 
especially regarding non-proliferation, and of the European Union …, are complied 
with’.43 Council Regulation 428/2009 establishes a system of authorisations for 
exports which are granted by national authorities and are recognised as valid 
throughout the Community.  
 
A detailed analysis of this system falls beyond the scope of this Chapter.44 For the 
purposes of this analysis, suffice it to point out the constitutionally charged and 
                                                
37 Common Position 2003/468/CFSP [2003] OJ L 156/79.  
38 Council Statement of 13 December 2004 further to the first stage of the Peer Review of Member 
States’ Export Control Systems for Dual Use Goods conducted in the framework of the EU Strategy 
against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Doc. 16069/04, Brussels 13 December 2004). 
39 The Council Working Group on Dual-Use Goods worked on these: see Report on progress made 
during 2005 to implement the recommendations of the Peer Review of Member States’ export control 
systems for dual use goods (Council Doc. 15826/05, Brussels 15 December 2005) and Implementation 
of the recommendations of the Peer Review of Member States’ export control systems for dual use 
goods - Report on progress made in 2006 noted by Council on 11 December 2006 (Council Doc. 
16507/06, Brussels 12 December 2006) 
40 COM(2006) 828 fin (Brussels, 18 December 2006).  
41 COM(2006) 829 fin (Brussels, 18 December 2006). 
42 [2009] OJ L 134/1, third recital. 
43 Ibid, third recital. This is also stressed in relation to the material scope of the measure, that is the 
common list of items subject to export controls and the process of their update: see sixth recital 
44 See the overview of its precursor, see P Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing 2006), 419 et seq. 
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politically sensitive background against which EU rules on exports of dual-use items 
are adopted: in the light of the dual-use nature of such products and technologies, the 
Union first adopted a set of rules which was based on both the EC legal framework 
and the Common Foreign and Security Policy,45 and it was only following the case-
law of the Court of Justice that this approach was viewed as unsustainable and was 
duly amended by a single EC instrument.46 This context is significant, for it suggests 
that the process of the transposition of the international commitments of the Member 
States and the Union into EU law is subject to the constitutional idiosyncrasies of the 
Union legal order which may well have an impact on the intensity of the ensuing legal 
framework.  
 
The issue of sanctions illustrates the above. According to the precursor to the current 
regime, it is for the Member States to provide for sanctions for infringements of its 
rules, provided that these are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.47 In its proposal, 
the Commission suggested that the Member States be required to introduce criminal 
penalties at least for serious infringements.48  
 
This proposal was noteworthy for a number of reasons. First, as criminal law is an 
area widely viewed as traditionally falling within the powers of the Member States, 
the proposal entered politically sensitive territory. Second, there was a clear 
international context within which the Commission justified its proposal. It is recalled 
that UNSC Resolution 1540, a reference point for EU initiatives in the area, refers to 
criminal sanctions expressly.49 It is also recalled that the establishment of criminal 
sanctions for violations of export control rules is also mentioned in a number of EU 
policy documents, such as the WMD and SALW Strategies. In a Declaration on 
Criminal Sanctions, the European Council welcomed the adoption of Resolution 1540 
and invited the Council to take concrete measures in order to achieve its objectives.50   
 
Third, in 2005, that is fifteen months prior to the Commission’s proposal, the Court of 
Justice rendered its judgment in the Environmental Crimes case where it held that 
Member States may be required to impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
criminal penalties for serious environmental offences when this is necessary in order 
to ensure the full effectiveness of the relevant rules.51 This judgment was followed up 
by the Maritime Pollution judgment, where the Court confirmed the broad application 
of the principle, albeit whilst tampering with its scope.52 It is interesting that neither 
the Commission’s Communication on the review of the relevant rules, nor its proposal 
                                                
45 Council Reg 3381/94 [1994] OJ L 367/1 and Dec 94/942/CFSP [1994] OJ L 367/8. 
46 This was the precursor to Reg. 429/2009, namely Council Reg 1334/2000 [2000] L 159/1, last 
amended by Council Reg 1167/2008 [2008] OJ L 325/1. For an analysis, see P Koutrakos, Trade, 
Foreign Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2001) Chs 5-6.  
47 Ibid, Art. 19 of Reg. 1334/2000.  
48 These would include an intentional export intended for use in a programme for the development or 
manufacture of chemical, biological, nuclear weapons or of missiles capable of their delivery without 
the authorisation required under this Regulation, or the falsification or omission of information with a 
view to obtaining an authorisation that would otherwise have been denied.   
49 Para. 3(d). 
50 Annex to Council Doc. 1077/04 (Brussels 23 June 2004) where reference is made ‘in particular [to] 
the measures to be taken in order to more effectively prevent the spread of sensitive goods and 
technologies’ (at 2). 
51 C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR –I-7879, para  48.  
52 Case C-440/05 Commission v Council [2007] ECR I-9097. See S Peers, ‘The European 
Community’s criminal law competence: the plot thickens’, (2008) 33 European Law Review 399. 
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for a recast Regulation include a reference to this case-law; what makes this even 
more curious is the fact that the current legal regime, as the preamble to Regulation 
1334/2000 indicated, largely owes its existence to the case-law of the Court.53  
 
The proposal about criminal penalties has not taken up by the Council and, in Article 
24, Regulation 428/2009 merely duplicates the general provision about effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive measures laid down in Article 19 of Regulation 
1334/2000. Instead, there is now an express reference to UNSC Resolution 1540 
(albeit in order to substantiate the application of the new rules to related materials), 
and a long recital in the preamble about the benefits of greater convergence and 
harmonisation of the application of the relevant rules by the competence authorities.54  
 
This episode illustrates how the interactions between the EU legal order and the 
international community, whilst dynamic and direct, are subject to the legal and 
political constraints which surround the Union’s idiosyncratic constitutional 
landscape; these inform the practical manifestations of these interactions and 
determine both their pace and direction. This is a point which will be made, in a 
different context, further below.  
 
(v)  Other measures  
 
A recent example of promotion of effective multilateralism is the initiative to support 
a legally binding International Arms Trade Treaty. Originating in United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 61/89,55 a process was initiated where a Group of 
Governmental Experts suggested step-by-step work within the UN context and which 
culminated to the adoption by the First Committee of the UN General Assembly of a 
Resolution entitled ‘Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international 
standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms’.56 
 
All EU Member States support this process. The EU is organising a number of 
activities aiming to increase awareness amongst national and regional actors, UN 
Members, civil society and industry of the discussions about the Treaty, and promote 
an exchange of views between these actors.57  
 
 
B.` Broad Construction of Security  
 
The Union’s approach is based on a broad understanding of security. Both the WMD 
and SALW Strategies use the European Security Strategy (ESS) as a point of 
reference.58 Adopted by the European Council in December 2003, this document set 
out the global challenges facing the EU (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, regional conflicts, State failure, organised crime) and the ways the EU 
                                                
53 For a different view, see A Dashwood, ‘Dual-use Goods: (Mis)Understanding Werner and Leifer’ in  
A Arnull, P Eeckhout, and T Tridimas (eds), Continuity and Change in EU Law – Essays in Honour of 
Sir Francis Jacobs (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2008) 354. 
54 N 42 above, eighteenth recital. 
55 Entitled ‘Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, 
export and transfer of conventional arms’ and adopted in December 2006.  
56 Adopted in October 2008.  
57 Council Decision 2009/42/CFSP [2009] OJ L 17/39. 
58 A secure Europe in a better world – European Security Strategy (Brussels, 12  December 2003). 
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must meet them. An analysis of the European Security Strategy falls beyond the scope 
of this Chapter.59 However, its broad definition of security is relevant to our 
discussion. The document stresses the link between security and development, as well 
as energy, and points out that, ‘in contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold 
War, none of the new threats is purely military’ nor can any be tackled by purely 
military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments’.60 
 
The SALW Strategy refers to the ESS time and again. It starts off by mentioning a 
point made in the latter, namely that the post-Cold War environment is one of 
increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are 
indissolubly linked. 
 
This close relationship between the ESS, on the one hand, and the WMD and SALW 
Strategies, on the other hand, is also illustrated by the common principles which 
govern their understanding of the prevailing international environment. The 
commitment to an international order based on effective multilateralism, for instance, 
is also drawn upon in the ESS. Therefore, the adoption of the WMD and SALW 
initiatives against the background of the ESS suggests a tangible impact of the ESS 
on, potentially, the entire range of EU policies.   
 
C. Cross-pillar  
 
Following from the above, the initiatives adopted by the EU both in the area of WMD 
and SALW are comprehensive in scope, covering the Community legal order as well 
as the second (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and third (Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice) pillars. The WMD Strategy points out in its introduction that the 
‘EU must act with resolve, using all instruments and policies at its disposal’ and, then, 
sets out ‘a broad approach covering a wide spectrum of actions’ whereby ‘non-
proliferation should be mainstreamed in our overall policies drawing upon all 
resources and instruments available to the Union’.61 To that effect, it provides for 
multilateral treaties and verification mechanisms, political initiatives, export controls, 
regulations on dual-use good, common policies related to criminal sanctions, 
integration of WMD non-proliferation concerns into the EU’s political, diplomatic 
and economic activities.  
 
Similarly, and in addition to the existing CFSP measures, the SALW Strategy sets out 
to ‘develop a comprehensive and coherent approach which harnesses all forms of 
leverage at the European Union’s disposal and is based on the recognition, formulated 
in the ESS, that human security and human development are interdependent’ and to 
‘develop new facets of the Union’s action to cover all the dimensions of the 
phenomenon, preventive and reactive’.62 Its objectives are achieved through a cross 
pillar approach too, including CFSP and ESDP instruments, partnership and 
cooperation agreements on political, development and trade areas, and coordination 
mechanisms, such as Europol and Eurojust. In fact, the SALW Strategy identifies 
three levels of means of cooperation: the EU and EC resources, the resources of the 
                                                
59 See, amongst others, S Biscop and J J Andersson (eds), The EU and the European Security Strategy 
(London, Routledge 2008).  
60 N 58 above, 7. 
61 N 5 above, 2 and 5 respectively. 
62 N 6 above, 7.  
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Member States, and those of the various multilateral players with which the EU has 
forged cooperation ties. 
 
This broad approach becomes apparent in the action plan which the SALW Strategy 
sets out. Consistent with the theme of effective multilateralism, its sets out a range of 
initiatives at international, regional, and EU levels. Of these, the regional and EU are 
particularly interesting. In relation to the former, it suggests the provision of financial 
and technical support for regional and national organisations such as the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Moratorium and for transforming 
them into legally binding regional Conventions. It also mentions the provision of 
support to the African Union and African regional organisations with the means to 
ensure the effective application of UN embargoes, as well as support for the OCSE 
action. On EU level, it provides for the inclusion of brokering and illicit transfers of 
SALW on the agenda for all the EU’s structured political dialogues with countries 
which export them and include it in the political dialogue with third countries and 
international, regional or sub-regional organisations. It also suggests an integrated 
approach to agreements with third countries, in particular envisaging the possibility of 
inserting a clause or an undertaking to cooperate in combating the illicit trade in 
SALW and their ammunitions in all agreements with third countries.63  
 
There is clear merit in the emphasis on the interconnections between the different 
facets of the Union’s external relations policies. On the one hand, it reflects the 
increasingly interdependent relations between security, development, foreign policy, 
and economic progress – this is recognised on the international plane and is illustrated 
by the work undertaken under the aegis of the United Nations. On the other hand, it 
reflects the very genesis of European integration: the establishment of a common 
market and the various developments which stemmed from it gave the impetus for a 
gradual expansion of the activities covered by European integration, albeit at a 
different pace and pursuant to varied institutional and procedural arrangements. It is 
only appropriate that, in construing its international role, the Union integrates the very 
core of its development into the wider framework of its external relations.  
 
However, this raises a number of questions, which will be addressed below: how is 
this ambitious construction of security, in general, and non-proliferation in particular, 
accommodated within the Union’s idiosyncratic constitutional framework? How are 
the different functions of the Union’s institutions be managed in a way which would 
ensure the effectiveness of the Union’s policy? And to what extent would that be in 
compliance with the distinct normative characteristics of the different sets of rules 
involved?  
 
D. The Union’s Understanding of Its Own Role  
 
                                                
63 In terms of tackling the problems raised by the availability of existing stocks, the Strategy also 
covers measures as diverse as the promotion of a commitment by all countries only to import and retain 
small arms to meet their legitimate security needs, financial assistance under older programmes such as 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration operations, financial and technical assistance for 
measures such as the keeping of regional small arms registers and the regular exchange of available 
information on exports, imports, the production and holding of small arms legislation, and appropriate 
measures to deal with the causes and consequences for human development of the illicit spread of 
SALW.  
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The principles outlined so far illustrate how the EU understands its overall role in the 
world. This appears to be based on two interrelated notions. The first is about 
‘responsibility’ in international affairs which the Union is convinced it must assume. 
The WMD Strategy, for instance, states that ‘all the States of the Union and the EU 
institutions have a collective responsibility for preventing these risks by actively 
contributing to the fight against proliferation’.64 And the SALW Strategy refers to the 
‘EU’s compelling obligation to act’.65  
 
This understanding of the EU’s international responsibility draws upon the thread 
which brings together different strands of the EU’s external relations. For instance, 
the ESS is based on the idea that ‘Europe should be ready to share in the 
responsibility for global security and in building a better world’.66 And the Laeken 
Declaration on the Future of European Union, the European Council wondered: 
‘[d]oes Europe not, now that it is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new 
world order, that of a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many 
countries and peoples?’.67 And the then President of the Commission, Romano Prodi, 
stated on the day of signing that Treaty that ‘today, Europe is reaffirming the unique 
nature of its political organization in order to respond to the challenges of 
globalisation, and to promote its values and play its rightful role on the international 
scene’.68  
 
The second tenet of the Union’s understanding of its international role in the area is 
its unique nature. The WMD Strategy states that the ‘European Union has special 
strengths and experience to bring to this collective effort’.69 This follows from the 
cross-pillar approach and the range of instruments into which the EU may tap which 
is set out as the Union’s distinct advantage: the SALW points out that the ‘European 
Union has unique assets for responding to this threat. With its capacity to use a full 
spectrum of civilian and military instruments for managing crises and post-conflict 
situations and to contribute to reconstruction, the Union is well placed top provide a 
comprehensive response’.70  
 
Again, this is a notion which is apparent in other areas of EU external relations too. 
The ESS points out that the ‘European Union is particularly well equipped to respond 
to such multi-faceted situations’.71 And in relation to the civilian aspects of crisis 
management, the Report of the Portuguese Presidency, adopted by the Feira European 
Council in June 2000, pointed out that ‘particular attention could be paid to those 
areas where the international community so far has demonstrated weaknesses. It 
would provide ‘added value’ as it would improve the Union’s capacity to react as well 
as the Union’s capability to meet the requests of the other lead organisations … This 
would … increase the Union’s visibility’.72 
 
                                                
64 N 5 above, para 12.  
65 N 6 above, 6.  
66 N 58 above, 2.  
67 14-15 December 2001. 
68 Speech delivered in Rome at the ceremony on the signing of the Constitutional Treaty 
(www.europa.eu.int/constitution/speaches_en.htm) 
69 N 5 above, para. 29.  
70 N 6 above, para. 18 
71N 58 above, 7. 
72 Feira European council, 18-20 June 2000, Presidency Conclusions, Annex I, Appendix 3, Part A. 
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III. Vertical principles governing EU non-proliferation policy  
 
In addition to the above, there are some principles which characterise the specific 
measures which flesh out the WMD and SALW strategies.  
 
 A. Mainstreaming, and the case of non-proliferation clauses 
 
The WMD Strategy provides for the mainstreaming of non-proliferation policies in 
the EU’s international relations, and refers, in particular, to the introduction of a non-
proliferation clause in agreements with third countries. Similarly, the SALW Strategy 
refers to the need to include the brokering and illicit transfer of SALW on the agenda 
of all the EU’s structured political dialogue with third countries; it refers in particular 
to countries in Eastern Europe and South-Eastern Europe (which hold surplus stocks 
of SALW left over from the Cold War), as well as Ukraine and Moldova in the 
context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). It also refers to the possibility 
of including a clause or an undertaking to cooperate in combating the illicit trade in 
SALW and their ammunition in all agreements with third countries.   
 
In an agreement reached in November 2003 as to the content and the scope of its 
application,73 the Council decided that the WMD clause should have two elements. 
The first provides for full compliance with and national implementation of the parties’ 
existing obligations under international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties 
and agreements and other relevant international obligations. This provision constitutes 
an essential part of the agreement. It is noteworthy that this provision does not 
commit a state to sign, ratify and implement any agreements which it has not already 
signed.74 The second part of the WMD clause provides for cooperation between the 
parties by fully implementing all other relevant international instruments and by 
establishing an effective system of national export controls – this provision may be 
considered as essential element on an ad hoc basis.75  
 
In 2009, five years following the introduction of this practice, the Council revisited 
the issue.76 This provides a positive assessment of the EU’s practice. It refers to 
agreements with almost 100 countries in which non-proliferation clauses have been 
inserted (in new or renewed mixed agreements and agreements concluded under 
Article 24 TEU). It also refers to additional text occasionally included in preambles or 
other relevant provisions of treaties in order to respond to specific concerns of EU’s 
partners, in particular regarding conventional weapons and SALW. Finally, it refers to 
a non-legally binding non-proliferation section inserted in several political documents 
adopted in the context of ENP.  
 
                                                
73 Council Conclusions 17 December 2003, Doc. 14997/03 Brussels 19 November 2003.  
74 Note, for instance, that India, Pakistan and Israel have not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty. 
75 As for its scope of application, the WMD clause was envisaged to be inserted in future mixed 
agreements, existing mixed agreements (on any occasion of renewal or revision, or even the suggestion 
by the EU for an amendment, or, if the above fails, by the negotiation of a separate legally binding 
instrument between the Parties which may include a link to the overall agreement), pure Community 
agreements (through the conclusion of a parallel instrument establishing a link with the EC agreement). 
76 See Doc. 5503/09 Note on the implementation of the WMD Clause, (Brussels, 19 January 2009).  
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So far, such a clause has been inserted in the agreement with the ACP countries,77 the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Albania,78 the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement with Tajikistan,79 the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Syria. 
This covers nearly one hundred states.80 It is interesting, though, that the EU should 
not feel bound to follow the wording of the standard clause to the letter. Instead, it 
‘ensur[es] that respective WMD clauses were compatible with the spirit and the 
content of the WMD standard clause’.81 
 
In practical terms, the EU’s record in the area has not been uncontroversial.82 In the 
case of India, there is currently only a vague reference to non-proliferation in the EU-
India Joint Action Plan83 which becomes even briefer in its 2008 reviewed version.84 
The Commission also decided to propose the negotiation of a trade and investment 
agreement without a non-proliferation clause. The EU envisages an upgrading of the 
current 1994 EU-India Framework Agreement or the negotiation of a new EU-India 
partnership and cooperation agreement which would include a non-proliferation 
clause.85 There is a Free Trade Agreement currently negotiated with India which is 
limited to trade and investment issues and which is envisaged by the Commission to 
be linked clearly in legal and institutional terms with the Framework Agreement.  
 
The inclusion of a WMD clause in the Association Agreement with Syria (finalised in 
December 2004, but only initialled in December 2008) was also controversial as its 
wording was changed a number of times in order to make it acceptable to the Syrian 
Government whilst satisfying the demands of the Member States. The negotiation of 
the clause threatened to derail the negotiation of the Agreement.  
 
 B. Proceduralisation and Institutionalisation    
 
The implementation of the initiatives undertaken by the EU in the area of non-
proliferation relies upon an intense web of subsidiary bodies and the heavy interaction 
(both formal and informal) amongst them and between them and the EU institutions. 
A number of layers of institutional interaction may be identified.  
 
                                                
77 See also, separately, the Agreement between the EC and its Member States, of the one part, and 
South Africa, of the other part, amending the Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation: 
COM(2010) 220 fin (Brussels, 7 May 2010). 
78 Art. 8(3): see Council Doc. 8164/06 (Brussels 22 May 2006) – this includes the two additional 
provisions mentioned in relation to the Agreement with Tajikistan.  
79 Art. 4 subparas 2 and 3: see COM(2004) 521 fin (Brussels 26 July 2004). This duplicates the model 
WMD clause save for two additions: a reference to the first part of the clause as part of the political 
dialogue that will accompany and consolidate the elements referred to therein, and a statement in 
relation to export controls that such dialogue may take place on a regional basis. 
80 See Six-monthly Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2008/II), Council Doc. 17184/08 (Brussels, 17 December 2008), 
p29.  
81 Ibid. 
82 See the account in L Grip, 'The EU Non-Proliferation Clause: A Preliminary Assessment (SIPRI 
Background Paper, November 2009). 
83 EU Strategic Plan – Joint Action Plan (New Delhi, 7 September 2005). 
84‘Global partners for global challenges: The EU-India Joint Action Plan (JAP)’ (Marseille, 29 
September 2008). 
85 See Written Question E-3607/2007 by A. Beer to the Commission.  
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The first layer involves the main actors in the area, namely the Council, the 
Commission, and the CFSP High Representative.86 The CFSP High Representative 
appointed a Personal Representative on non-proliferation and WMD, who is also 
responsible for the SALW Streategy.87 Her appointment was envisaged to give 
sharper focus to these issues in the dialogue with third countries. She assists EU 
Member States in their efforts to coordinate policies in the area of conventional arms 
exports controls.  
 
There is also a Council CFSP Working Group on global arms control and 
disarmament (CODUN), and one on non-proliferation (CONOP), the latter dealing 
mainly with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), other non-proliferation and 
export control regimes, and assistance to Russia for chemical weapons destruction. 
Both Groups consist of senior disarmament and non-proliferation officials from 
Member States, as well as personnel from the non-proliferation and disarmament 
section of the Council's General Secretariat and an official from the Commission's 
security policy unit, and meet once a month in Brussels. There is also a Working 
Group on export of arms (COARM) which reviews the application of the Code of 
Conduct, provides support for the negotiations of an International Arms Trade Treaty, 
oversees the implementation of the Common Position of 2003 on brokering, and deals 
with issue of end-use controls, as well as the organisation of outreach activities with 
third countries (in particular Ukraine, Norway).  
 
There is another layer, consisting of the WMD Monitoring Centre (WMD-MC) which 
is envisaged to oversee the implementation and development of the WMD Strategy, 
create synergy between efforts by various EU actors involved, and support the EU’s 
contacts with third countries and organisations.88 The same applies to the SALW 
Policy where practical measures are envisaged to strengthen the synergy between the 
various actors.89 
 
Finally, there are other external relations bodies involved such as the Political and 
Security Committee whose role is set out in Article 25 TEU. Made up by the political 
directors of the Member States' foreign ministries, it is responsible for monitoring the 
international situation in the CFSP area, contributing to the definition of policies, and 
monitoring the implementation of the Council's decisions. 
 
Against this background of intense institutional activity, the policies provide for their 
regular monitoring. For instance, the SALW Policy is regularly reviewed and updated 
every six months by means of an interim report by the Presidency on its 
implementation.90 This heavily structured and proceduralised framework with its 
multiple institutional layers need to be understood in the light of the broad range of 
activities which the Union’s cross-pillar approach entails and the ensuing quest for 
coherence. 
                                                
86 For the role of the European Parliament, see EP Resolution on non-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction: A role for the European Parliament [2006] OJ C 280E/453 at 462.  
87 She is Annalisa Giannella and was appointed in October 2003.  
88 Council Doc. 6694/06 EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD: Monitoring and enhancing 
consistent implementation (Brussels, 12 December 2006) at p4 et seq. 
89 The EU Strategy refers to the Council Secretariat which is to work closely with the Situation Centre 
to promote the collection and circulation of information and intelligence form the Member States p15). 
90 N 6 above, 9.  
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C.  The Quest for Coherence  
 
The broad understanding of security, the consolidation of the various legal 
instruments available to the Union’s panoply, the cross-pillar dimension of the 
relevant activities, all suggest that the coherence of the EU’s action is of paramount 
importance. This is entirely consistent with the central role that the requirement of 
coherence has assumed in the conduct of EU external relations.91 In normative terms,  
Article 3 TEU refers to the ‘consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out 
[by the Union] in order to achieve its objectives’, as well as the requirement of 
‘consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, 
security, economic and development policies’.  
 
Furthermore, the coherence of the EU external action has also been at the very centre 
of the group therapy process which the EU has undergone since the drafting of the 
Constitutional Treaty and which is still underway, pending the outcome of the second 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. This is illustrated by the mandate of the 
2007 Intergovernmental Conference which mentions it in the very first paragraph.92  
 
In terms of policy, the increasing emphasis on the requirement of coherence is also 
illustrated by the concerted effort of EU institutions and the Member States to address 
it, at least as a matter of principle, in the EU external relations activities where it 
seems to matter the most, such as development93 and humanitarian aid, where the 
Council, the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting 
within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission adopted policy 
documents where they stress the multifarious dimensions of development and 
humanitarian aid policies, set out common principles and good practice, and underline 
the need for coherence, complementarity and effectiveness as a matter of policy.94 
Non-proliferation features prominently in these efforts. The European Consensus on 
Development, for instance, having acknowledged the complementarity between 
security and development policies within the context of the EU, goes on to state the 
following: 95 
 
‘The EU, within the respective competences of the Community and the Member States, will 
strengthen the control of its arms exports, with the aim of avoiding that EU-manufactured 
weaponry be used against civilian populations or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in 
developing countries, and take concrete steps to limit the uncontrolled proliferation of small 
                                                
91 See M Cremona, 'Coherence in EU Foreign Relations Law' in P Koutrakos (ed.), European Foreign 
Policy - Legal and Political Perspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2010) (forthcomimg). 
92 See IGC 2007 Mandate, Council SG/11218/07, POLGEN74, para.1: ‘The IGC is asked to draw up a 
Treaty (hereinafter called the "Reform Treaty") amending the existing Treaties with a view to 
enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the enlarged Union, as well as the coherence of 
its external action’. 
93 See, for instance, the Council’s Resolution on Coherence Between the Community Development 
Cooperation and its Other Policies (Annex to Development Council meeting of June 5, 1997), the 
Parliament’s Resolution on the coherence of the various policies with development policy (Doc. B5-
0117/2000 [2000] OJ C 339/208), and the Commission’s  COM (2005) 134 fin. Policy Coherence for 
Development.  
94 See The European Consensus on Development [2006] OJ C 46/1, and The European Consensus on 
Humanitarian Aid [2008] OJ C 25/1. 
95 Ibid, para 37. 
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arms and light weapons, in line with the European strategy against the illicit traffic of small 
arms and light weapons and their ammunitions’. 
 
In practical terms, the quest for coherence renders the issue of management of the 
EU’s activities of vital importance. The SALW Strategy notes the need to ‘ensure 
consistency and complementarity between Council decisions in the CFSP framework 
and actions implemented by the Commission in the field of development aid in order 
to promote a consistent approach for all EU activities in the SALW area’.96  
 
The Union’s approach to ensuring coordination appears to have certain common 
features. First, it targets specific areas in relation to which it develops a structured and 
integrated policy approach. This is illustrated by the EU’s approach to Africa. In 
2005, the EU adopted the EU Strategy for Africa97 in which non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destructions features as a specific area where the EU is to step up its 
efforts to promote peace and security by improving overall coordination and 
cooperation to ensure full compliance with relevant international obligations and 
export control regimes. In addition, special emphasis is paid on the promotion of an 
integrated approach to address the proliferation of SALW and landmines.98 The EU, 
then, along with the African Union, adopted the Joint Africa-EU Strategy.99 One of 
the four objectives of this long-term partnership is to address global challenges and 
common concerns, amongst which feature the proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction and the illicit trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons.100  
 
Second, the Union focuses on the development of a distinct procedural dimension 
aiming to enhance the management and coordination of the relevant actors and their 
outputs: for instance, the Joint Progress Report on the implementation of the Africa-
EU Joint Strategy, drawn up following the Africa-EU Ministerial Troika meeting in 
Addis Ababa in November 2008, refers to ‘the holding of the first ever meeting 
between the AU Peace and Security Council and the EU Political and Security 
Committee, the regular consultations and exchange of information between the AU 
Commission, on the one hand, the European Commission and the Council’s General 
Secretariat, on the other’.101  
 
Third, there is a distinct focus on enhancing capacity-building, networking, 
cooperation and exchange of information. For instance, in relation to SALW, 
Explosive Remnants of War, Anti-Personnel Landmines, and the fight against illicit 
trafficking, the specific measures envisaged include work towards the development of 
an African Small Arms and Light Weapons Strategy by December 2009, the 
development of modalities to engage African experts in the implementation of the EC 
funded project in support of RPCCO's activities in the field of SALW by the end of 
June 2009), and the organisation of a joint workshop on the eradication of ERW in 
2009.102 
                                                
96 N 6 above, 15.  
97 COM (2005) 489 fin EU Strategy for Africa - Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa’s 
Development (Brussels 12 October 2005).  
98 Ibid, 22. 
99 Lisbon Summit, December 2007.  
100 Ibid, 2-3. 
101 P4 
102 P5. 
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Fourth, there is the multiplicity of administrative layers and institutional actors 
mentioned above. In relation to the Union’s policy towards Africa, for instance, the 
CFSP High Representative appointed a Special Representative to the area.103 The 
Joint Action setting out is mandate makes it clear that he is responsible for the 
CFSP/ESDP aspects of the policy objectives set out in the EU Africa Strategy. 
However, as these objectives are intrinsically linked, his coexistence with other 
relevant EU actors becomes of paramount significance. Article 12 of Joint Action 
2008/898/CFSP is entitled ‘coordination’ and reads as follows:   
 
The EUSR shall promote overall EU political coordination. He shall help to ensure that all 
EU instruments in the field are engaged coherently to attain the EU's policy objectives. The 
activities of the EUSR shall be coordinated with those of the Presidency and the Commission, 
as well as those of other EUSRs active in the region as appropriate. The EUSR shall provide 
Member States' missions and Commission's delegations with regular briefings. 
 
In the field, close liaison shall be maintained with the Presidency, Commission and Member 
States' Heads of Mission who shall make best efforts to assist the EUSR in the 
implementation of the mandate. The EUSR shall also liaise with other 
international and regional actors in the field. 
 
What is interesting is that the Special Representative was also appointed as the 
European Commission Head of Delegation. This double-hatting is seen as improving 
the coherence of the EU’s approach.104 However, this ‘managerial’, inward-looking 
and structure-focused approach risks making the effectiveness of the Union’s policies 
hostage to the complex internal dymamics of the relationship between the various 
Union’s bodies and institutions involved.    
 
IV. Inter-Institutional Tensions and Judicialisation  
 
The broad understanding of security by the EU actors, the ever-wider range of 
activities which non-proliferation policies underpin, and the multiplicity of legal rules 
and procedures governing them have created a significant degree of interinstitutional 
tension. Whilst by no means unique in this area,105 this phenomenon has manifested 
itself in a controversial manner in the process of the Union’s efforts to combat SALW 
proliferation. In ECOWAS,106 the Commission challenged the adoption by the Council 
of Decision 2004/833/CFSP implementing Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP on an EU 
contribution to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).107 This 
measure had been adopted in order to provide for a financial contribution and 
technical assistance in order to set up the Light Weapons Unit within the ECOWAS 
structure and to convert the Moratorium on SALW into a Convention between the 
                                                
103 Joint Action 2007/805/CFSP [2007] OJ L 323/45, extended by Joint Action 2008/898/CFSP [2008] 
OJ L 322/50. 
104 In a statement, Solana stated that ‘The joint appointment of Mr Vervaeke is a reflection of our 
common will to combine all the instruments of the European Union and thereby ensure a coherent 
approach towards Africa at all levels’ (6 December 2007, S355/07). 
105 In the area of EU external relations generally, see P Koutrakos, ‘Legal Basis and Delimitation of 
Competence in EU External Relations’ in M Cremona and B de Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing 2008) 171 
106 Case C-91/05 Commission v Council [2008] ECR I-3651.   
107 [2004] O L 359/65. 
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ECOWAS Member States. The Commission argued that such action fell within the 
scope of development policy and, as such, ought to have been adopted under EC law.   
 
The Court annulled the Council Decision and held that ‘a measure having legal effects 
adopted under Title V of the EU Treaty affects the provisions of the EC Treaty within 
the meaning of ex Article 47 TEU whenever it could have been adopted on the basis 
of the EC Treaty, it being unnecessary to examine whether the measure prevents or 
limits the exercise by the Community of its competence’.108  
 
The ECOWAS judgment must be understood in the light of the clear interinstitutional 
tension which underpins the conduct of EU external relations in general and its non-
proliferation policies in particular. This sets the background against which substantive 
policy choices are made. It becomes very clear that the rhetoric of coherence, when 
assessed in the light of the interinstitutional interactions, tells us a story distinctly 
more nuanced than that emerging from the Union’s policy documents. This, in turn, 
brings the Court of Justice at the very centre of the external relations arena.  
 
In ECOWAS, the Court concludes that a dual-legal basis involving both EC and CFSP 
rules is ‘impossible’ where a measure caries out both security and development 
cooperation functions.109 It also suggests that a CFSP measure may also contribute to 
EC objectives if it has the implementation of the CFSP as its main purpose. However, 
this is precisely what the problem is: this assessment is heavily dependent upon finely 
balanced views as to the proper objective of a measure and its content. Such an 
assessment is extremely difficult to make, and the willingness of the EU institutions to 
qustion each other's assessment before the Court, as well as the latter's controversial 
approach, are bound to fuel inter-institutional tensions and challenge any effort to b  
 
In the context of non-proliferation, for instance, Regulation 1717/2006 establishing an 
Instrument for Stability deals with assistance in response to situations of crisis or 
emerging crisis. Its aim is ‘to contribute to stability by providing an effective response 
to help preserve, establish or re-establish the conditions essential to the proper 
implementation of the Community's development and cooperation policies’.110 In this 
context, it refers to technical and financial assistance regarding the impact on the 
civilian population of the illicit use of and access to firearms and covers survey 
activities, victim assistance, raising public awareness and the development of legal 
and administrative expertise and good practice. In terms of principle, assistance is 
purported to ‘be provided only to the extent necessary to re-establish the conditions 
for social and economic development of the populations concerned, in a situation of 
crisis or emerging crisis’ and is intended ‘not [to] include support for measures to 
combat the proliferation of arms’.111  
                                                
108 N 106 above, para. 60. See the annotation by C Hillion and R Wessel, ‘Competence distribution in 
EU external relations after Ecowas: Clarification or continued fuzziness?’ (2009) 46 Common Market 
Law Review 551 and the criticism in Editorial, ‘Development and foreign policy: where to draw the 
line between the pillars’’, (2008) 33 ELRev 289. For another recent judgment on the relationship 
between EC and CFSP rules, see Case C-403/05 Parliament v Commission (re: Philippines borders) 
[2007] ECR I-19045, and the annotation by M Cremona in (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 
1727. 
109 N 106 above, para 76.  
110 [2006] OJ L 327/1, Art. 1(2)(a). The Commission has proposed its amendment to reflect the 
ECOWAS judgment: see COM(2009) 195 fin. 
111 Ibid, Art. 3(2)(i).  
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In practical terms, the intense interdependence between different activities and the 
multiplicity of actors and administrative bodies involved in the conduct of the overall 
policy would entail a difficult balancing exercise with unclear repercussions for the 
effectiveness and timing of the specific policy initiatives. All this makes the role of 
the Court increasingly prominent and important. This, in itself, is not surprising – 
after all, the genesis of the Community’s external relations policies and their 
development owe a considerable debt to its contribution.112 However, viewed against 
the background of the increasingly interdependent policies pronounced by the Union 
and the bitter interinstitutional disputes to which these give rise, it is regrettable that 
the Court has neither produced principles clear and consistent in their application, nor 
avoided the danger of rendering its role increasingly politicised.113  
 
Against this background, the Court’s approach to ex Article 47 TEU in ECOWAS may 
have various implications. First, it may encourage further inter-institutional disputes 
and, therefore, is likely to hinder the already difficult exercise of achieving coherence 
in the EU’s external relations policy. Second, it may make the Member States more 
reluctant to establish express links between different sets of rules in instruments 
adopted in related areas but within different legal frameworks. Third, it does not 
contribute to the addressing the difficulties of achieving coherence. This latter point 
may be seen as the other side of the coin: to stress the interdependence between the 
Union’s security, non-proliferation, development, and economic policies is a 
commendable political imperative – but its corollary is that standards of coherence are 
set which are extremely difficult to achieve in the Union’s multidimensional, 
idiosyncratic constitutional order. And the Union’s way of dealing with this problem, 
is thinking both broadly and narrowly: that is, by introducing instruments which 
straddle legal frameworks and by creating layers of administrative structures entrusted 
with the coordination of the various activities and the management of their 
implications. The practice of these gives rise to disputes which gives rise to legal 
proceedings creating, therefore, a vicious circle which appears to govern the Union’s 
international role.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This Chapter set out to examine the interactions between the EU and the rest of the 
world in the area of non-proliferation. It suggested that the Union not only 
acknowledges the significance of non-proliferation in the current geopolitical 
environment, but it also engages actively and directly with the international 
community in ways which have an impact across the range of the activities it pursues. 
However, the picture of the actor which it emerges is one of considerable 
ambidexterity: grand statements coexist with small-scale projects aimed to produce 
tangible effects; direct interactions with third countries and international organisations 
multiply, and yet they are subject to administrative and institutional layers of 
considerable density; the politically sensitive implications of the policy are addressed 
                                                
112 This is illustrated by the introduction of the principle of implied competence, the construction of the 
Community’s exclusive competence in the area of CCP as well as the broad construction of the scope 
of the latter in the 1970s: see P Koutrakos, n 44 above, Chs 1-3. 
113 See M Cremona, External Relations of the EU and the Member States: Competence, Mixed 
Agreements, International Responsibility, and Effects of International Law (EUI Working Papers, Law 
No 206/22) n 51, and P Koutrakos, n 105 above, 176-185. 
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whilst Europe’s judges are gradually dragged into the regulation and management of 
the ensuing initiatives. As it is linked to the constitutionally idiosyncratic nature of the 
EU’s legal order, this characteristic and the complex web of actors, policies and 
interests in which it originates would be difficult to remove. The challenge for the 
Union is to manage it - and this is a challenge which law cannot meet on its own.114  
 
 
                                                
114 For the limited effects that the Lisbon amendments of the EU primary rules may have, see P 
Koutrakos, P. 'Primary law and policy in EU external relations-moving away from the big picture', 33 
European Law Review 666. 
